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A b s t r A c t
Regulators and corporate governance activists are lobbying companies to eliminate the CEO duality; however, the effectiveness of this 
recommendation is questioned given that empirical evidence has found conflicting results. This document studied the effects of the 
CEO’s duality on the value of the company in a sample of 104 Mexican companies that were publicly traded between 2000 and 2013. 
For this, different regression models were estimated using the ordinary least squares technique. The firm value was measured through 
Tobin’s Q and ROA. Empirical results showed that there is no relationship between CEO duality and value after controlling for board 
characteristics such as size and independence. 
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Dualidad del CEO y valor de la empresa: evidencia de 
México
r e s u m e n
Los reguladores y los activistas del gobierno corporativo están presionando a las empresas para que eliminen la dualidad del CEO, sin 
embargo, la efectividad de esta recomendación es cuestionada dado que la evidencia empírica ha encontrado resultados contradictorios. 
Este documento estudió los efectos de la dualidad del CEO en el valor de la empresa en una muestra de 104 empresas mexicanas que 
cotizaron públicamente entre 2000 y 2013. Para esto, se estimaron diferentes modelos de regresión utilizando la técnica de mínimos 
cuadrados ordinarios. El valor de la empresa se midió a través de la Q de Tobin y el ROA. Los resultados empíricos mostraron que 
no existe una relación entre la dualidad del CEO y el valor de la empresa después de controlar las características de la junta, como el 
tamaño y la independencia.
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1. Introduction
The corporate scandals of the late 90’s and the early 00’s have 
given corporate governance research and practice increased 
attention (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). Regulation (Sarbanes 
–Oxley and OECD Principles for Corporate Governance) 
has been developed to improve governance practices 
worldwide (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; OCDE, 2017). Most of 
it has been based on agency theory and focused on defining 
guidelines for the board of directors (Hinna & Monteduro, 
2017). Corporate governance literature has been focused 
mainly on UK and US companies, with very little research 
on emerging markets such as Mexico, where regulation and 
the economic environment are different. Research on the 
board of directors as a corporate governance mechanism 
is plentiful, however most of the literature on boards of 
directors has focused on board size and composition. Little 
research has been done on other board characteristics, 
most notably the importance of the CEO/chairman duality. 
On the other hand, Mexico’s business environment has 
evolved over the last three decades. It has changed from 
a government-controlled environment (80´s) to an open 
market dominated by private ownership (90’s and 00’s) 
(Price, Román, & Rountree, 2011). This dramatic change, 
along with the size of the Mexican consumer market 
(population of more than 100 million) has attracted large 
amounts of foreign investment thus increasing the need 
for corporate governance in companies. Mexico is the 
second largest economy in Latin America, just behind Brazil 
and way ahead of Colombia and Argentina. Its model of 
Corporate Governance, as with the rest of Latin American 
countries, is closely related to the Continental European 
model. However it presents unique features such as a small 
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capital market (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
2000b), weak protection of shareholders (La Porta et al., 
2000b), a weak legal system (Klapper & Love, 2004) and high 
ownership concentration in founding families (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000a). Literature on 
corporate governance in Mexico is scarce. There is research 
only in governance as a whole (Husted & Serrano, 2002), 
governance recommendations and reforms (Machuga & 
Teitel, 2007; Price et al., 2011), ownership (Klapper & Love, 
2004; La Porta et al., 2000a). Mexico implemented a new 
governance law in 2006, which followed Sarbanes-Oxley 
principles of limiting board size and defining guidelines that 
promote board independence.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the relationship 
between CEO duality and performance in an emerging 
market environment. Empirical evidence is mixed on the 
relationship between CEO duality and value (Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Dey, Engel, & Liu, 2011), while 
some authors support agency theory on the negative 
impact of duality on value (Christensen, Kent, & Stewart, 
2010; Dahya, Garcia, & Van Bommel, 2009; Dechow, Sloan, 
& Sweeney, 1996; Dogan, Elitas, Agca, & Ögel, 2013; Faleye, 
2007; Jermias & Gani, 2014; Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & 
Bierman, 2010) others support stewardship theory by 
arguing for a positive relationship between CEO duality 
and firm value (Amaral-Baptista, Klotzle, & de Melo, 2011; 
Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Vera & Ugedo, 2005; Yang & Zhao, 
2014). There is even evidence of no relationship between 
CEO duality and firm value (Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 
2005; Amba, 2013; Braun & Sharma, 2007; Chen, Lin, & Yi, 
2008; Elsayed, 2007; Lam & Lee, 2008; Meyer, 2006; Pucheta-
Martinez, 2015; Raluca-Georgiana, 2013). 
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This paper adds to literature by providing evidence of the 
impact of CEO duality as a corporate governance variable 
on firm value with data from Mexico. It also provides 
evidence of the relationship between board characteristics, 
family ownership and governance reforms and firm value for 
an emerging market such as Mexico. This study is valuable 
for shareholders and directors in Mexico. Through better 
governance firms should be able to increase their access 
to external financing, by decreasing risk and lowering their 
cost of capital, their value increases and they should be 
able to attract more investors (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). 
It is also valuable for regulators in their quest to assess 
whether governance laws based on the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act have a positive impact on value in emerging markets 
where economic and legal environments are different. The 
paper used data of listed companies from the Mexican 
Stock Exchange for the 2000-2012 period since it allowed 
the author to have enough observations from before and 
after the new stock market law of 2006 was adopted, thus 
enabling assessment of its impact on value. Empirical results 
showed that there is no relationship between CEO duality 
and value after controlling for board characteristics such as 
size and independence. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the 
literature review and explains the hypothesis, Section 2 
reviews the research methodology, describing data and 
statistics, Section 3 presents the results and discusses the 
findings, while Section 4 concludes and explains research 
limitations. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis 
development
2.1. Corporate governance and firm value in 
Mexico
Mexico’s business environment has evolved over the last 
three decades. It has changed from a government-controlled 
environment (80´s) to an open market dominated by private 
ownership (90’s and 00’s) (Price et al., 2011). This dramatic 
change, along with the size of the Mexican consumer 
market (population of more than 100 million) has attracted 
large amounts of foreign investment thus increasing the 
need for corporate governance in companies. Mexico is the 
second largest economy in Latin America, just behind Brazil 
and way ahead of Colombia and Argentina. Its model of 
Corporate Governance, as with the rest of Latin American 
countries, is closely related to the Continental European 
model. However it presents unique features such as a small 
capital market (La Porta et al., 2000b), weak protection of 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000b), a weak legal system 
(Klapper & Love, 2004) and high ownership concentration 
in founding families (Klapper & Love, 2004; La Porta et al., 
2000a).
Research on corporate governance for Mexico is limited. 
Some studies on corporate governance for Mexico have 
focused on the impact of governance recommendations 
and guidelines on value. While Machuga & Teitel (2007) 
and Price et al. (2011) agree on the lack of evidence of a 
positive impact on firm value due to the implementation 
of such recommendations, Chong & Lopez-De-Silanes 
(2006) provides evidence that when companies in Mexico 
implemented differentiating governance tools effectively, 
they were able to get lower costs of capital and thus 
increased their value.
2.2. Corporate governance, CEO duality and 
firm value
Stewardship theory presents an interesting contrast to 
agency theory by studying the conditions in which agents 
act in the principals best interest rather than on self-
interest (Schillemans, 2013). Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson 
(1997) suggests that the perspective changes from one of 
control (agency theory) to one of focusing on the premises 
under which stewardship works. The word steward goes 
back to monarchical times where a person serves and 
represents the monarchy, and thus is not expected to 
act as independent agent with interests different than 
the ones of the principal. Schillemans (2013) summarizes 
various contrasting assumptions between agency theory 
and stewardship theory by suggesting that stewards are 
motivated by collective goals (intrinsic motivation, i.e. 
reputation, realization, acknowledgment) rather by self-
interest (extrinsic motivation, i.e. financial incentives). 
He also suggests that agents require more control while 
stewards are more autonomous.
Stewardship theory´s biggest differences with agency 
theory in the corporate governance context lie in both the 
treatment of CEO duality and board independence. CEO 
duality refers to the fact that the CEO and the chairman 
of the board of directors are the same person (Rechner 
& Dalton, 1991). Stewardship theory argues for a unified, 
stronger leadership and a more insider oriented board, 
where agents are aligned with shareholders and advise is 
more important than control (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson 
& Davis, 1991). Agency theory, on the other hand argues 
for no duality and for more independent boards since both 
these characteristics provide better control and thus better 
shareholder protection (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983).
In general, corporate governance codes recommend 
avoiding CEO duality. However, empirical evidence about 
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the relationship between CEO duality and firm value 
presents mixed results (Dalton et al., 1998; Dey et al., 
2011). On the one hand, the agency theory suggests the 
concentration of power in the CEO allows the achievement 
of individual objectives at the expense of the interests of 
the shareholders (Jensen, 1993). In the same way, limits the 
board’s main responsibility of monitoring the CEO. Thus, 
argues for board independence as a better mechanism for 
monitoring management, meaning that by separating these 
two roles management entrenchment is controlled and 
boards become more independent and thus create value 
(Peng, Zhang, & Li, 2007). Previous studies support a negative 
relationship between CEO duality and value generation 
(Christensen et al., 2010; Dahya et al., 2009; Dechow et al., 
1996; Dogan et al., 2013; Faleye, 2007; Jermias & Gani, 2014; 
Tuggle et al., 2010)
On the other hand, stewardship theory argues that a unified 
leadership (CEO and Chairman of the Board being the 
same person) improves efficiency organizational (Bhagat 
& Black, 2002; Daily & Dalton, 1993; Donaldson & Davis, 
1991; Peng et al., 2007). The word steward goes back to 
monarchical times where a person serves and represents 
the monarchy, and thus is not expected to act as an 
independent agent with interests different than the ones 
of the principal. Following this line of thought, managers 
that act as stewards create value just by representing 
the principals properly (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & 
Davis, 1991). The organizational structure that optimizes 
“steward type” managers is one where managers have 
total authority over the company. CEO duality, a common 
leadership structure found in Mexico is an example of such 
structure. CEO duality is supported by stewardship theory 
since it argues for a stronger more united leadership where 
interests are aligned and where advice more than control 
is needed (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
Previous studies support a positive relationship between 
CEO duality and value generation (Amaral-Baptista et al., 
2011; Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Peng et al., 2007; Vera & 
Ugedo, 2005; Yang & Zhao, 2014). 
Finally, other studies have found that the relationship 
between CEO duality and performance is neutral (Adams 
et al., 2005; Amba, 2013; Braun & Sharma, 2007; Chen et 
al., 2008; Elsayed, 2007; Lam & Lee, 2008; Meyer, 2006; 
Pucheta-Martinez, 2015; Raluca-Georgiana, 2013). The 
lack of agreement in the literature makes it interesting 
to investigate whether there is a significant relationship 
between CEO duality and the firm value in Mexico. This 
generates three hypotheses:
H1a:  There is a positive and significant relationship 
between CEO duality and the firm value in Mexico.
H1b: There is no significant relationship between 
CEO duality and the firm value in Mexico. 
H1c: There is a significant negative relationship 




This study used data from 101 Mexican listed companies 
with 914 observations from the period between 2000 
and 2013. The reasons behind using this sample are: (1) 
Corporate Governance Law was published in 2006 which 
helps in testing the impact of such law by using pre and 
post 2006 periods; (2) The advantage of taking such a large 
sample of years provides more observations and thus 
providing robustness to the results. Board data (Duality, 
Size, Composition) was obtained from individual company’s 
annual reports. All financial figures were obtained from the 
Mexican Stock Exchange information system and validated 
from annual reports. Information on the governance law 
was obtained from the Mexico Stock Exchange webpage. 
3.2. Variables and research model
The following variables were used in the analysis: 
The dependent variable was the firm value, measured 
through the TOBIN’S_Q. This study also used ROA as 
dependent variable to provide robustness to the model. 
The independent variable was CEO_DUALITY. Finally, 
to ensure that the results will not be addressed by the 
heterogeneity of the companies, it was controlled by 
variables that the literature has associated with firm value. 
These control variables commonly found in the literature 
are BOARD_SIZE, INDEPENDENT, FAMILY, adoption of a 
corporate governance law (LAW_2006), GROWTH, SALES, 
LIQUIDITY as well as the lagged value of the dependent 
variable which is expected to be significant because a 
previous positive and significant TOBIN’S_Q might affect 
positively for the next period. 
The usage of the lagged dependent variable on the right 
hand side of the equation as an independent variable has 
been used in the literature (e.g. Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). 
Most governance literature argues for either a positive or 
negative relationship between mechanisms such as board 
size, board independence, and ownership structure with 
firm value. Since it is expected for these variables to have a 
relationship to firm value, they will be controlled for isolate 
CEO duality`s impact on value.   Table 1 shows the detailed 
definition of the variables. 
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Table 1. 
Variable definition of research model 
Variable  Definition
TOBIN’S_Q =
It was defined as the relationship between market price and book value of company assets. It was 
calculated as equity market value + book value of liabilities/replacement book value of assets (Coles, 
Daniel, & Naveen, 2008).
ROA = Proxy for economic performance. It was calculated as net profit/ book value of assets (Jara, López-Iturriaga, San-Martín, & Saona, 2019). 
CEO_DUALITY = This is a dummy variable and can be defined as 1, when CEO and chairman of the board are the same person and 0 when they are not (Tang, 2017). 
BOARD_SIZE  Number of board members (Cavaco, Challe, Crifo, Rebérioux, & Roudaut, 2016). 
INDEPENDENT = It was defined as the proportion of independent directors within the board. It was calculated as number of independent directors/total number of directors (Cavaco et al., 2016). 
FAMILY =
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the company is considered to be family owned and takes 
value 0 when it is not. This study considered that a family-owned a company when one family held more 
than 35% of the shares (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003).
LAW_2006 = It is a dummy variable in the model with 1 being all observations after the publication and implementation of the law and 0 being all observations before the implementation of the law.
GDP_GROWTH = This is a control variable since overall performance by the Mexican economy can have a direct effect on the value of Mexican companies. The information comes from the database provided by the World Bank. 
SALES = Proxy for firm size. It was calculated as the natural logarithm of sales (Boubakri, Guedhami, & Saffar, 2016).
LIQUIDITY =
The liquidity index measures the amount of times that a certain stock of a company is traded within a 
certain period. The index is generated for the Mexican Stock Market and takes value from 1 to 10, 1 
being the minimum value given to stocks with low liquidity and 10 the maximum value given to stocks 
with high levels of liquidity. 
YEAR = Dummy variable to identify the year of the analysis, 2001-2012.
Source: Own elaboration
Results for an initial model that did not take into account 
time-varying effects are presented in column (a) in Table 6. 
After controlling for time-varying effects by including year 
dummy variables, a final model was developed (column h in 
Table 6):
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows the summary of the descriptive statistics for 
the variables in the model. Table 3 presents the difference 
of means tests that were made for each variable to prove 
whether there is statistical significance in the difference 
between groups (before and after law). This will be useful 
to determine whether board´s and firm´s characteristics 
change significantly between periods. Average TOBIN’S_Q 
for the period is 1.76 with a standard deviation of 3.21. It 
varies from a minimum of 0.01 to a maximum of 57.78. It 
rises from an average of 1.27 for the period before the 
implementation of the law to 2.06 for the period after the 
implementation (Table 3).  A two-sample t test with equal 
variances show the difference of 0.79 to be statistically 
significant at Pr(T>t) = 0.0000. This means that company`s 
value increased after the law was implemented. CEO_
DUALITY presents an average of 0.44 with a standard 
deviation of 0.50.  It has an average value of 0.44 before law 
implementation and 0.43 after (Table 3). It can be assumed 
the small difference that could exist between the two 
periods is not statically significant with a Pr(T>t) = 0.79. 
This shows that on average Mexican companies maintained 
their leadership structures before and after the law.
BOARD_SIZE showed an average of 11.7 directors with 
a standard deviation of 3.66.  This variable changed from 
a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 21 members. The mean 
grew from 11.61 (2000 to 2006) to 11.76 (2007 to 2013) 
(See table 18). A two-sample t test with equal variances 
showed the difference of 0.15 which is statistically 
insignificant. INDEPENDENT, measured by the percentage 
of independent directors showed an average of 0.45 with 
a standard deviation of 0.18; these results range from 
a minimum of 11% to a maximum of 100%. The average 
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for data prior to 2006 to 0.47 for data after 2006 (Table 
3). A two-sample t test with equal variances showed the 
difference to be statistically significant at Pr(T>t) = 0.00. 
This means that the percentage of independents changed 
significantly between the two above-mentioned periods. 
FAMILY has a mean of 0.68 in the sample, indicating that 
68% of the observations for the companies studied are 
family owned. This is consistent for emerging economies 
where markets are small and ownership is concentrated 
(Klapper & Love, 2004; La Porta et al., 2000a). This result 
doesn´t change much between periods. It has a value of 0.71 
before and 0.66 after the implementation of governance 
regulations (Table 3). This difference is not significant with 
a Pr(T>t) = 0.10, meaning that ownership structure did not 
change during the sample period. 
Tables 2 and 3 also contain the descriptive statistics for 
the control variables. GDP_GROWTH has a mean of 2.45 
that changed from 3.09 to 2.06 between periods (Table 3). 
This difference, as can be expected by the changes in GDP 
growth after the financial crisis of 2008, turned out to be 
significant in the t-test with a Pr(T>t) = 0.0000. SALES, the 
proxy variable for firm size, presents an average of 15.94 
with a standard deviation of 1.76 going from a minimum 
value of 9.2 to a maximum of 20.3. It goes from an average 
of 15.81 (2000 to 2006) to an average of 16.01 (2007 to 
2013) (Table 3). A two-group t test with equal variances 
showed the difference to be statistically significant at 
Pr(T>t) = 0.08. These results show an important increase 
(statistically significant) on the size of listed firms, which 
is consistent with Mexican economic growth over this 
period. Finally, LIQUIDITY presents an average of 5.87 with 
a standard deviation of 2.19. It goes from an average of 6.32 
(2000-2006) to an average of 5.59 (2007-2013) (Table 3). 
The difference is significant with a Pr(T>t) =0.00 and can be 
once again explained by the consequences that arose from 
the 2008 crisis, in which the stock markets from all over the 
world lost credibility and trading volumes decreased.
Table 3. 
Difference of means Test Governance Law
 Mean (0) Standard Deviation Mean (1) Standard Deviation Pr
TOBIN’S_Q 1.27 1.50 2.06 3.87 0.00
CEO_DUALITY 0.44 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.79
BOARD_SIZE 11.61 3.67 11.76 3.66 0.55
INDEPENDENT 0.42 0.17 0.47 0.18 0.00
FAMILY 0.71 0.45 0.66 0.47 0.10
GDP_GROWTH 3.09 1.83 2.06 3.06 0.00
SALES 15.81 1.69 16.01 1.79 0.08
LIQUIDITY 6.32 1.98 5.59 2.26 0.00
Notes: Difference of mean test for the variable LAW_2006 in which Mean (0) Information prior to corporate governance implementation and Mean (1): 
Information after corporate governance implementation.
Source: Own elaboration
Table 2. 
Descriptive statistics for the complete sample 
 Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
TOBIN’S_Q 914 1.76 3.21 0.01 57.78
CEO_DUALITY 914 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
BOARD_SIZE 914 11.70 3.66 4.00 21.00
INDEPENDENT 914 0.45 0.18 0.11 1.00
FAMILY 914 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00
LAW_2006 914 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00
GDP_GROWTH 914 2.45 2.71 -4.70 5.30
SALES 914 15.94 1.76 9.21 20.32
LIQUIDITY 914 5.87 2.19 0.01 9.66
Source: Own elaboration
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Table 5. 
Correlation matrix for the complete sample
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 TOBIN’S_Q 1         
2 BOARD_SIZE -0.062 1        
3 INDEPENDENT 0.003 0.526 1       
4 CEO_DUALITY 0.047 0.116 0.019 1      
5 LAW_2006 0.115 0.020 0.138 -0.002 1     
6 SALES -0.008 0.338 0.176 -0.065 0.057 1    
7 FAMILY 0.073 0.029 -0.037 0.069 -0.054 0.248 1   
8 GDP_GROWTH -0.028 -0.037 -0.021 -0.030 -0.163 -0.033 -0.007 1  
9 LIQUIDITY 0.020 0.266 0.246 -0.055 -0.160 0.579 0.117 -0.019 1
10 ROA -0.258 0.001 0.023 0.076 -0.019 0.107 -0.017 0.032 0.051
Source: Own elaboration
Table 4 provides evidence of the differences between 
companies with different leadership structures (duality 
and no duality). This table presents the results of a t-test 
taking CEO_DUALITY as the fixed variable. TOBIN’S_Q 
(proxy for value), did not change significantly between 
groups. It changed from 1.61 to 1.95 respectively having 
a non-significant difference at Pr(T>t) =0.11. This shows 
that firm value does not change significantly between two 
different leadership structures. On the other hand, variables 
such as BOARD_SIZE, SALES, FAMILY and LIQUIDITY had 
different results. For these variables the difference between 
means was statistically significant. BOARD_SIZE for non-
dual companies has an average of 11.32 while board size for 
dual companies has an average of 12.19; this difference (0.87) 
is statistically significant which shows that companies with 
duality have larger boards. SALES, the proxy for firm size also 
present significant differences, while non-duality companies 
show an average of 16.03 dual companies show an average 
of 15.81 meaning that companies with CEO duality tend to 
be smaller than non-duality ones. Companies without CEO 
duality tend to be on average less concentrated. Lastly, dual 
companies show a significantly lower liquidity index (5.70) 
than non-dual companies (5.99) which means that during 
the period from 2000 to 2013 dual company stocks were 
traded less than non-duality companies.
The study checked for the multi-collinearity among the 
different variables. As can be seen in Table 5 there is no 
abnormally high correlation between variables thus 
providing validity to regression results. 
Table 4. 
Difference of mean test CEO Duality 
 Mean (0) SD Mean (1) Standard Deviation Pr
TOBIN’S_Q 1.61 2.55 1.95 3.90 0.11
BOARD_SIZE 11.32 3.45 12.19 3.87 0.00
INDEPENDENT 0.46 0.18 0.44 0.17 0.20
FAMILY 0.65 0.48 0.72 0.45 0.04
GROWTH 2.47 2.66 2.43 2.77 0.84
SALES 16.03 1.76 15.81 1.74 0.06
LIQUIDITY 5.99 2.24 5.70 2.11 0.05
Notes: Includes information of the difference of mean test for the variable CEO duality in which Mean (0) Information for companies without CEO duality 
and Mean (1): Information for companies with CEO duality 
Source: Own elaboration
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4.2. Regression results
Results from the original model’s regression reveal no 
relationship between any of the governance related 
variables and firm value except for law implementation. 
CEO_DUALITY, BOARD_SIZE, INDEPENDENT and 
FAMILY showed no significant relationships at any 
level while LAW_2006 turned out to be positively and 
significantly related to firm value, however when controlling 
for time varying effects (see column h) this positive 
relationship disappeared. Results of the regression of the 
adopted model, presented in column (h) on Table 6 showed 
an R-Squared of 0.4411, suggesting that 44.11% of the 
variations of TOBIN’S_Q of the sample are explained by 
the independent variables. 
CEO_DUALITY, the dummy variable for leadership 
structure was positive (0.145) but not significant therefore 
leading to the conclusion that in the Mexican case, CEO 
duality does not have any impact on firm value supporting 
hypothesis H1b.  This shows that the division between CEO 
and chairman of the board does not have any relevance to 
the creation of value. Second, results show that there is no 
linear relationship between TOBIN’S_Q and BOARD_SIZE 
(non-significant coefficient of -0.017). The low magnitudes 
and the p-values are conclusive and show that the number of 
members in the board of directors does not appear to have 
any impact in firm´s value. Third, percentage of independents 
(INDEPENDENT), the proxy for board independence was 
positive at 0.062 but again non-significant providing evidence 
of board independence not being related to value.  It is 
important to report that results on governance variables 
(CEO duality, board size and board independence) and 
their relationship with value do not support agency theory 
which might mean that agency theory is not applicable for 
emerging markets. Fourth, FAMILY, the dummy variable that 
showed whether the company was family owned or not 
was also positive but non-significant (coefficient of 0.214). 
This provides evidence to conclude that family ownership 
is not an important variable in generating value for Mexican 
firms. Two of the other control variables, GDP_GROWTH 
and LAG_TOBIN’S_Q, show significant relationships with 
TOBIN’S_Q. These results provide validity to the model 
since it can be expected for both of them to be related 
to value. The GDP_GROWTH coefficient is positive with 
a 0.126 and Lag (1 year) of Tobin´s Q, 0.649, both having a 
level of significance of 1%. LIQUIDITY had a positive but 
non-significant relationship while SALES was negative but 
small in magnitude and non-significant.
4.3. Robustness tests
Different regressions were run to test for robustness. 
Table 6 summarizes all the complementary regressions 
that were made from columns (b) to (g). Regression (b) 
eliminates LAG_TOBIN’S_Q coefficient and thus leading 
to a decrease in the R-squared of near 37%. Regression 
(c) takes as control variable of GDP_GROWTH a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one when GDP_GROWTH 
is over zero and, zero if not, this shows very similar results 
as the ones presented in the first column. The next two 
regressions (d-e) take ROA or the logarithmic value of 
ROA+1 as independent variables leading to a low R-squared. 
Regressions on columns (f) and (g) changed the dependent 
variable, with ROA replacing TOBIN’S_Q in the equation. 
Under these scenarios not a single variable is significant 
thus giving validity to the model.
It is important to mention the possibility of reverse 
causation between firm value (Tobin’s Q) and duality, 
meaning that good or bad results might drive shareholders 
to either change the leadership structure of the company. In 
order to check against reverse causation a complementary 
regression was run with TOBIN’S_Q as an independent 
variable and duality as the dependent variable (column (i) of 
Table 6) and no significant relationship was found between 
these variables.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Regulators and corporate governance activists are lobbying 
companies to eliminate the CEO duality, however, the 
effectiveness of this recommendation is questioned given 
that empirical evidence has found conflicting results, for 
instance, about the relationship between duality and firm 
performance. Two theories have been used to support 
these empirical results. On the one hand, agency theory 
states that independent boards provide better monitoring 
of management and thus create value (Anderson & Reeb, 
2004; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Krivogorsky, 2006). 
A dual leadership promotes management entrenchment and 
management behavior (such as appointment of nonqualified 
board members) that could hamper the effectiveness of 
monitoring done by the Board (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, stewardship theory 
contradicts agency theory by arguing that duality increases 
accountability and is less costly (Bhagat & Black, 2002; Daily 
& Dalton, 1993; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
This paper studied the effects of CEO duality on firm value 
in Mexico in a sample of 104 Mexican companies that were 
publicly traded between 2000 and 2013. The firm value 
was measured through Tobin’s Q and ROA. Since other 
governance variables such as board independence and size 
might have an impact on value they were used as control 
variables in the study. Results show that CEO duality has no 
impact on firm value, thus showing that different leadership 




 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
 TOBIN’S_Q TOBIN’S_Q TOBIN’S_Q TOBIN’S_Q TOBIN’S_Q ROA ROA TOBIN’S_Q CEO_DUALITY
Constant 0.069 2.144 -0.862 0.699 1.487 -0.565 -0.328 0.108 0.704
 1.131 2.795 1.151 1.016 0.952 0.385 0.251 1.114 0.434
BOARD_SIZE -0.018 -0.062 -0.013 -0.070 -0.072 -0.003 -0.003 -0.017 0.020*
 0.023 0.050 0.023 0.046 0.040 0.004 0.003 0.022 0.013
INDEPENDENT -0.053 0.494 -0.009 0.653 0.459 0.062 0.057 0.062 -0.020
 0.698 1.522 0.694 1.544 1.265 0.069 0.048 0.232 0.244
CEO_DUALITY 0.139 0.390 0.134 0.545 0.471 0.060 0.038 0.145  
 0.235 0.585 0.231 0.494 0.414 0.046 0.030 0.232  
LAW_2006 0.520*** 0.920*** 0.460*** 0.860*** 0.810*** -0.025 -0.022 -0.182 -0.026
0.128 0.239 0.119 0.210 0.186 0.034 0.018 0.176 0.052
LOG_SALES -0.014 -0.111 -0.006 -0.015 -0.055 0.038 0.023 -0.010 -0.032
 0.082 0.207 0.081 0.084 0.084 0.028 0.018 0.079 0.034
FAMILY 0.229 0.558 0.220 0.475 0.374 -0.033 -0.024 0.214 0.106
 0.195 0.476 0.195 0.430 0.383 0.058 0.036 0.188 0.103
GDP_
GROWTH 0.110*** -0.003 0.025 0.005 0.010*** 0.003 0.000 0.120*** 0.002
 0.0031 0.012 0.051 0.015 0.008 0.003 0.001 0.036 0.003
LIQUIDITY 0.040 0.132 0.650*** 0.142 0.108 0.004 0.002 0.040 -0.016
 0.051 0.108 0.033 0.111 0.120 0.006 0.003 0.048 0.024
LAG_
TOBIN’S_Q 0.640***  1.300***    0.640*** 0.006
 0.035  0.413     0.331 0.007
ROA    -2.559      
    2.714      
LOG_ROA+1     2.051     
     4.976     
LAG_ROA       0.480***   
       0.056   
YEAR        Included  
TOBIN’S_Q         0.005
         0.007
R2 0.411 0.034 0.418 0.095 0.053 0.050 0.279 0.441 0.044
Notes: Six regressions are show in which (h) is conclusive regression and the others are complementary. (f) and (g) correspond to regression using ROA 
as dependent variable. (i) uses duality as dependent looking for reverse causation. While (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) are without using years dummy variables, 
without the lagged value of Tobin’s Q using GDP_GROWTH dummy, using ROA as independent variable and using the lagged value of ROA+1, respectively. 
Standard errors below coefficients (*pr>0.1; **pr>0.05; ***pr>0.01)
Source: Own elaboration
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structures do not affect value within an emerging market 
context such as Mexico. This suggests that in the Mexican 
context, both the role of the CEO and the chairman of the 
board are not as efficient in generating value. Given that 
there is ample evidence on the role of the CEO and the 
board of directors in the generation of value, it is proposed 
that these roles be reinforced to guarantee adequate 
protection for investors.
Finally, most of the governance variables included in this 
research do not appear to have a definite relationship with 
value for emerging markets therefore further research on 
this topic is needed. Further research can be conducted 
on different governance variables (such as management 
ownership, block holder ownership, compensation, board 
dynamics and specific family characteristics – generation, 
involvement) and their relationship with value to be able to 
assess whether governance is really important in emerging 
markets. These variables were not included in this research 
and might provide deeper knowledge for academics, 
investors and regulators. 
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